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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 191 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs-AvoIDANCE OF PERIL-REFUSAL To ADJUDI· 
CATE RIGHTS OF WILL BENEFICIARY UNDER No-CoNTEST CLAUSE-Testator, 
plaintiff's father, acquired property in the joint names of himself and his 
wife by using money belonging to his wife. At her death testator claimed 
sole ownership of the property as the survivor. Plaintiff agreed not to 
probate his mother's will if testator would bequeath the property to his 
children. Also, testator agreed that if he should remarry he would, by a 
prenuptial agreement, make it possible to carry out the plan. The agree-
ment was not reduced to writing. Testator remarried and shortly there-
after executed a will in which he disregarded the verbal agreement and 
left a substantial part of his estate to his second wife. The will also con-
tained a clause providing that any beneficiary under the will who con-
tested any part of its contents should forfeit all rights thereunder.1 Plain-
tiff brought suit under the declaratory judgment act,2 asking whether a 
1 Such so-called "terror" clauses in wills are generally judicially upheld. See AT-
KINSON, WILLS 408-09 (2d ed. 1953). 
2 MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 691.501, 691.507 (1948): "No action or proceeding in any court 
of record shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment, 
decree or order is sought thereby, and the court may, in cases of actual controversy, make 
binding declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed, 
or not, including the determination at the instance of anyone interested in the controversy, 
of the construction of any statute, municipal ordinance or other governmental regulation, 
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suit for specific performance of the oral contract would be a contest within 
the meaning of the clause. Defendant's motion to dismiss the bill as not 
stating a proper ground for declaratory relief was granted by the district 
court. On appeal, held, affirmed. The declaratory judgment device is not 
available for the protection of interests which will be placed in jeopardy 
only if the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance and loses. McLeod 
v. McLeod, 365 Mich. 25, 112 N.W.2d 227 (1961). 
The declaratory judgment device is generally utilized in two types of 
situations: first, where the rights under consideration are capable of being 
settled by a coercive decree but where the plaintiff desires only a declara-
tion; and second, where no other relief is possible but where an actual 
controversy arises because a claimed legal right or interest of the plaintiff 
has been placed in danger by a conflicting claim of the defendant.3 As 
to the first category, many courts have held, without persuasive reasoning, 
that the availability of another form of relief is sufficient to defeat a 
declaratory judgment action.4 Unless another type of action is required 
by a relevant statute5 such decisions are manifestly wrong,6 since the de-
claratory judgment statutes almost invariably contain provisions that such 
relief may be obtained "whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed."7 Such statutes recognize that in many instances the use of a 
or any deed, will or other instrument in writing, and a declaration of the rights of the 
parties interested, but the foregoing does not exclude other cases of actual controversy • 
• . • This act is declared to be remedial, and is to be liberally construed and liberally ad• 
ministered with a view to making the courts more serviceable to the people." 
3 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 26 (2d ed. 1941). 
4 See, e.g., Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487, 490, 117 S.E.2d 336, 339 (1960); Bryarly 
v. State, 232 Ind. 47, 111 N.E.2d 277 (1953); Brown v. Brodsky, 348 Mich. 16, 81 N.W.2d 
363 (1957). 
5 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 53, § 25057 (1957) (setting forth the procedure for 
obtaining a variance to zoning regulations) and Castle Shannon Coal Corp. v. Upper St. 
Clair Township, 370 Pa. 211, 88 A.2d 56 (1952) (holding that because of the statute, a 
declaratory judgment as to the right to a variance could not be sought). 
6 See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 26 ~al. 2d 753, 761, 161 P.2d 217, 221 
(1945); Cohen v. Reisman, 203 Ga. 684, 48 S.E.2d 113 (1948); Maas v. Maas, 305 Ky. 490, 
204 S.W.2d 798 (1947); Kartzevitz v. Shertz, 213 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Moore v. 
Moore, 344 Pa. 324, 25 A.2d 130 (1942). 
7 Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958); Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act, 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. § 1 (1922) [as of December 1961 this act has 
been adopted in 36 states-including Georgia (in a modified form), and Indiana (but com• 
pare cases cited note 4 supra)-and Puerto Rico); ALAsKA COMP. LA.ws ANN. § 52A-1-17(l)(b) 
(Supp. 1959); Cu.. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1060; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-29 (1958); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6501 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 228-1 (1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-3127 (1949); KY. REv. STAT. § 418.040 (1962); MICH. COMP. LA.ws § 691.501 (1948): 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-6-1 (1953); N.Y. CIV. PRAG. ACT § 473; OKLA. STAT, tit. 22, § 1651 
(1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-578 (1950). But see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491:22 (1955), the 
only statute which does not contain the phrase "whether or not other relief is or could be 
sought" or similar language. See also Lisbon Village Dist. v. Lisbon, 85 N.H. 173, 155 
Atl. 252 (1931) (refusing relief where plaintiff could obtain coercive relief). Mississippi 
is the only state which has no declaratory judgment statute. 
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declaratory judgment will be more advantageous than a coercive decree as 
it presents a particular issue of law which the court can decide quickly,8 
thus settling contentions between the parties prior to serious injury and 
before the relationship is disrupted. It accomplishes this more efficaciously 
than the demurrer because it does not have to be decided upon an agreed 
statement of facts.9 And finally, it is suggested that although it is an 
adversary action, some of the belligerence found in a suit for damages or 
an injunction is removed.10 
However, the declaratory judgment proceeding probably finds its great-
est utility in actions of the second type-those where no other relief is 
possible. The advantages here may be seen through a comparison of de-
claratory and coercive suits. When bringing a suit for a coercive decree, 
the plaintiff must state a "cause of action" by showing he has received 
an injury for which the law gives a remedy. But the declaratory judgment 
statutes make it possible to move back a step, giving the courts jurisdiction 
to hear cases before injury has occurred. This procedure contemplates two 
adverse parties, each willing to obey the law if he knows what it is. That 
this can be accomplished by the statutes should no longer be open to 
question.11 However, a problem remains as to the proper timing of the 
s Many states provide that a declaratory judgment suit may be advanced on the 
court's calendar; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CooE § 1062(a); KY. REY. STAT. § 418.050 (1960); 
MICH. COMP. LAws § 691.502 (1948); FED. R. CIV. P. 57. 
o The right to decide disputed facts is given by statute in some states; see, e.g., 
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 691.504 (1948); Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 9A UNIFORM 
LAws ANN. § 9 (1922). Other states have allowed this by judicial decision; e.g., Howard 
v. Howard, UH Cal. App. 2d 308, 313, 280 P .2d 802, 805 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Employer's 
Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Tibbetts, 96 N.H. 296, 298, 75 A.2d 714, 716-17 (1950). The 
federal system has allowed this by court rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 57. 
10 See Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory Judg-
ment, 16 MICH. L. REY. 69, 75-76 (1917). 
11 See, e.g., Woodward v. Fox W. Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz. 251, 284 Pac. 350 (1930) 
(plaintiff sought assurance that lease was valid before erecting improvements); Roths-
child v. Wolf, 20 Cal. 2d 17, 123 P.2d 483 (1942) (whether building subject to stairway 
easement might be demolished); Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 
(1931) (whether owner might improve his property as he desired despite restrictive cove-
nants); Whiteside v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 284 Mass. 165, 187 N.E. 706 (1933) (plaintiffs 
uncertain whether defendant's interest in his grandfather's estate came within the terms 
of an assignment to them by defendant; plaintiffs wanted to sell the interest if theirs); 
Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N.W. 618 (1930) (whether 
plaintiff could replace existing building without forfeiting lease); Carolina Power & 
Light Co. v. Iseley, 203 N.C. 8ll, 167 S.E. 56 (1932) (whether plaintiff might substitute 
bus service for streetcar service under its contract with the city); Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 172 N.E. 455 (1930) (whether plaintiff could build a 
church on land restricted by covenants); Glauberman v. University Place Apts., Inc., 188 
Misc. 277, 66 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (whether lessee could sublet); Multnomah 
County Fair Ass'n v. Langley, 140 Ore. 172, 13 P.2d 354 (1932) (whether plaintiff's plan 
for conducting horse racing was illegal); Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 
Pa. 507, 140 At!. 506 (1928) (whether lessor must rebuild building destroyed by fire). 
Anticipatory relief in equity is plainly insufficient, because of the historical development 
of equity jurisprudence and the often rigorous threshold "adequacy" test of equity 
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suit. · The "actual controversy" requirement has been construed by the 
courts to mean that the facts must be such as to allow the rendition of a 
final judgment: the issue presented may not be moot nor the opinion re-
quested advisory.12 Thus where the value of the judgment rests upon the 
mere possibility of the happening of certain events, or where intervening 
facts have made a decision unnecessary, the case is considered not "ripe" for 
determination.13 · But even where the "controversy" requirement is met, the 
statute's wording that "the court may in cases of actual controversy .. .''14 
does not require an adjudication necessarily to be made.15 The court in 
the principal case seemingly holds that there is no justiciable controversy 
because the need for the decision is contingent upon plaintiff's bringing 
and losing a suit for enforcement of his contract, neither of which is fore-
seeably certain,16 and not that they are refusing to hear the case in the 
exercise of judicial discretion. By such an application of the "controversy" 
requirement there is effectively no difference between a declaratory suit and 
an ordinary "cause of action," as the parties will be required to upset the 
status quo and cause injury before they may settle their differences. The 
point at which the declaratory judgment should be given is arguably where 
adverse parties have done all that they can without harming either them-
selves or others, and where one desires to act further if he may do so 
without penalty. 
It would seem that this point had been reached by the litigants in the 
principal case. Any further action on the part of the plaintiff might have 
meant irreparable injury for him, while failure to take further action would 
have meant giving up a claim to valuable property. An adjudication by 
the court on the point in contention would have removed any uncertainty 
as to whether and how the plaintiff should proceed.17 In other cases where 
jurisdiction, to encompass the variety of situations covered by declaratory judgment 
statutory provisions. 
12 A moot issue is one in which intervening circumstances have removed the con-
troversy between the parties, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Pierce, llO F.2d 27 
(3d Cir. 1940) (while on appeal, a decision in another suit between the parties settled 
the contended issues). In an advisory opinion there may also be no justiciable contro-
versy either because the facts are hypothetical or contingent, or because the parties do 
not have a sufficient interest in the outcome; e.g., Merkley v. Merkley, 12 Cal. 2d 543, 
86 P.2d 89 (1939) (plaintiff asked for adjudication of rights under certain contracts if 
sometime in the future her husband should default on his alimony payments); Heller 
v. Shapiro, 208 Wis. 310, 242 N.W. 174 (1932) (plaintiff asked for an adjudication of 
subrogation rights if and when he pays off a mortgage). 
13 Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455, 471, 131 Atl. 265, 271 (1925): "jurisdiction 
will never be assumed unless the tribunal appealed to is satisfied that an actual con-
troversy, or the ripening seeds of one, exists between [the] parties. . . ." 
14 MICH. COMP. LAws § 691.501 (1948). 
15 See Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455, 471, 131 At!. 265, 271 (1925). (Emphasis 
added.) 
16 Principal case at 34, 112 N.W.2d at 231. 
17 If a judgment had been given for the defendant no litigation would have followed; 
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a court has refused to give an adjudication of the issues presented, the 
moving party was usually not definite in asserting his proposed action. 
Thus, where a court was asked if a certain result would follow if and 
when a mortgage was paid,18 or where the complaint was made that a zoning 
ordinance might interfere with uses the plaintiff might desire to make of 
his property,19 adjudication by declaration was refused. But such was not 
the kind of situation presented in the principal case, where the plaintiff 
averred that in order to preserve his rights "it has now become necessary" 
to institute an action for specific performance.20 The step between this 
statement and the conclusion that the plaintiff will attempt to enforce 
his claims if he can do so without fear of forfeiture is not an arduous one. 
Seemingly, if the court is correct in its refusal to issue a declaration, no 
party seeking to avoid a perilous situation may do so by a declaratory 
judgment, as the parties will never have done all they might do until the 
controversy has produced an otherwise justiciable "wrong." Further doubt 
is cast upon the correctness of this decision by the results reached in similar 
cases in other jurisdictions. In Dravo v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,21 
the plaintiff also requested a declaration as to whether his proposed action 
conflicted with the no-contest provision of a will; the court was faced with 
the same double contingency argument, but held that under the expanding 
concept of the use of declaratory judgments such a defense had no validity.22 
if it had been given for the plaintiff there might have been a settlement. In either 
event there is a good possibility that the court could have settled the contention and 
avoided all future litigation by a relatively simple declaration. 
18 Heller v. Shapiro, 208 Wis. 310, 242 N.W. 174 (1932). 
19 Weigand v. City of Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 Pac. 978 (1925). 
20 Principal case at 29, 112 N.W.2d at 228-29. 
21 267 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1959). The Michigan and Kentucky statutes are substantially 
the same. Compare Mien. COMP. LAws § 691.501 (1948) (quoted supra note 2), with KY. 
R.Ev. STAT. §§ 418.040-.045 (1960). "In any action in a court of record of this Common-
wealth having general jurisdiction wherein it is made to appear that an actual con-
troversy exists, the plaintiff may ask for a declaration of rights, either alone or with 
other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of rights, whether or not 
consequential relief is or could be asked. . • • Any person interested under a deed, 
will or other instrument of writing, or in a contract, written or parol; or whose rights 
are affected by statute, municipal ordinance, or other government regulation; or who 
is concerned with any title to property, office, status or relation; or who as fiduciary, 
or beneficiary is interested in any estate, provided always that an actual controversy 
exists with respect thereto, may apply for and secure a declaration of his right or duties, 
even though no consequential or other relief be asked. The enumeration herein con-
tained does not e.xclude other instances wherein a declaratory judgment may be prayed 
and granted under KRS 418.040 of this act, whether such other instance be of similar 
or different character to those so enumerated." 
22 Accord, Cohen v. Reisman, 203 Ga. 684, 48 S.E.2d 113 (1948) (declaration granted 
that plaintiff could bring an action against the executor without forfeiting her rights 
under a no-contest clause); Estate of Badenhop, 61 N.J. Super. 526, 161 A.2d 318 (1960) 
(trustee obtained a declaration of whether a no-contest clause would be violated by 
defending in an appeal from the probate proceeding); Lanyon v. Lanyon, [1927] 2 Ch. 
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Other cases where courts have been faced with this same problem are 
those dealing with the interpretation of leases, contracts, deeds and stat-
utes.23 In each of these cases one of the parties desired to know if pro-
posed action could be taken without penalty. In each case the court had 
no guarantee, other than an averment in the petition, that if it declared 
in favor of the party's right to proceed he would do so. Yet each time the 
court felt that the dilemma in which the plaintiff found himself was suffi-
ciently developed and perilous to necessitate the rendering of a decision. 
The only basis upon which a court faced with this type of situation could 
refuse to hear the case is in the exercise of its discretion, and not because 
there is no justiciable controversy. But even this mode of refusal would be 
inappropriate. That it is desirable to know whether proposed action may 
be taken without fear of penalty or forfeiture hardly needs to be stated. 
To facilitate this, courts responsible for the orderliness of society should 
lend their aid to any rational scheme which will prevent parties from 
doing harm to themselves and others, and should not invoke rules which 
require that damage be done first and rights be decided later.24 The 
Michigan court has invoked just such a rule in the principal case, and 
in so doing has defeated both the letter and the spirit of the declaratory 
judgments act. 
Burton L. Raimi, S.Ed. 
264 (gift in will conditioned on beneficiary not manying a blood relative declared to 
be against public policy); Page v. Public Trustee, [1926] Ch. 842 (gift conditioned on living 
in a certain place; declaration given as to effect of moving away at behest of husband). 
23 See, e.g., cases cited note 11 supra. 
24 "Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then tum on the light 
to see if you stepped into a hole. Under declaratory judgment law you tum on the 
light and then take a step." 69 CoNc. REc. 2108 (1928) (speech by Representative Gilbert, 
Kentucky), BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 931. 
